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FORENSIC MEDICINE
THE MOMENT OF DEATH:
AN INTERNATIONAL MEDICO-LEGAL PROBLEM
CONCERNING HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
BYRON E. SIEGEL
f EDICAL SCIENCE, throughout the world, has begun to focus
an increasing amount of attention on the complex subject of
human organ transplantation.' It was not until the advent of the
first human heart transplant, however, that legal scholars of the
world were forced to re-examine
their conceptions of the mo-
THE AUTHOR: BYRON E, SIEGEL (A.B., ment of death.' It has become
The University of Michigan; J.D., apparent that before physicians
Wayne State University) is a member
of the Michigan Bar and is presently can utilize transplantation pro-
completing studies toward an LL.M. in cedures to a greater advantage,
Legal Medicine at Case Western Re-
serve University. assuming the rejection phenom-
enon can be better controlled, 3
there must be an international
guideline created for the determination of the true moment of death.
1 To help familiarize the reader with the various problems involved in human organ
transplantation, see generally, Symposium on Reflections on the New Biology, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 267 (1968); three-part series, Transplantation, 282 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 786, 848, 896, (1970); Woodside, The Doctor's Dilemma and the Lawyer's Re-
sponsibility, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 66 1970); Halley and Harvey, On an Interdisciplinary
Solution to the Legal-Medical Definitional Dilemma in Death, 2 INDIANA L.F. 217
(1969).
2 See Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 436
(1968), wherein Chief Justice Warren Burger of the United States Supreme Court wrote:
The complaint of some is that our standards of ethics and rules of law do not
keep pace with scientific developments and the potentials of experimental
medicine, and thus do not give experimental programs a free rein. This is
probably correct. Law and ethical standards are not subjects of research and
discovery; they are fruits of slow evolutionary processes. The law does not
search out as do science and medicine; it reacts to social needs and demands.
3 The rejection problem is based upon the attempt by researchers to prevent graft
rejection of the transplanted tissue by the recipient's physiological mechanism. Thus,
subsequent to transplantation, immunosuppressive therapeutics are instituted by admin-
istration of corticosteroids, such as Immuran or Cortisone, or recently, Anti-Lymphocyte
Globulin. However, not only do such therapeutics often fail to prevent the rejection,
but they also inevitably lower the body's natural resistance to bacterial infection, such
as from Pneumococcal bacteria which produce pneumonia. See generally, Terasaki,
Heart Transplants - The Immunologic Questions, 1968 Hosp. PRAC., vol. 4; How
Long Will it Take?, 1967 MED. WORLD NEWS 35 (1967), Cardiac and Other Organ
Transplantation, 206 J.A.M.A. 2489 1968).
4 The crux of the problem of determining the exact moment of death is that if the
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Only after international agreement has been reached, concerning
when death actually occurs, can the more advanced problems of or-
gan donations between countries or the transportation of organs
across national borders be resolved.'
Recorded controversy over the actual center of life functions
began as far back as the Babylonians, who thought the liver was
the seat of the soul and center of life.6 The Egyptians, on the
other hand, felt the heart was most essential for life functions.7
Leonardo Da Vinci, trying to observe the moment of death, spent
hours attempting to view the soul as it departed from a recently-
expired patient.'
Man gradually distinguished the religious aspects of death by
deciding that the soul was the basis of spiritual life and the heart
and lungs the center of physical life. Thus emerged the concept
that death was "the apparent extinction of life, as manifested by the
absence of heartbeat and respiration." 9 A modification of the classic
definition of death, which is slightly more precise than the older test,
requires the existence of insensibility, meaning clinical absence of
cerebral activity and reflexes, cessation of respiration, cessation of
circulation, and irreversibility.'0
These older legally accepted definitions of death raise many
transplant team waits too long after the donor has suffered failure of metabolic processes,
such as brain functions, circulation, and respiration, then the tissue extracted from such
donor will be decomposed and useless for transplantation purposes. Thus, anoxia, or
lack of oxygen to the brain, will cause irreversible brain damage after about four min-
utes:
When a person stops breathing, he already has a small amount of oxygen
stored in his lungs and an additional amount stored in the hemoglobin of his
blood. However, these are sufficient to keep metabolic processes functioning
for about two minutes. Continued life beyond this time requires an addi-
tional source of energy. This can be derived for perhaps another minute or so
from glycolysis....
A. Guyton, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 975 (3d ed. 1966).
r See generally; Stewart & Wasmuth, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ
Transplantation, 14 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 442 (1965); Barrish, Law of Testamentary
Disposition - A Legal Barrier to Medical Advance, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 40 (1956);
Leatherberry, Heart Transplant: Legal Problems and the Need for New Legislation, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1080 (1968); Authority Asked to Use Homicide Victims' Or-
gans, 1969 AMA NEws; Hall, The Doctor and the Law - Some Medicolegal Problems
Involved in Human Tissue Donation and Transplantation, 1969 NEW PHYSICIAN 505.
6 Brewer, Cardiac Transplantation: An Appraisal, 205 J.A.M.A. 101 (1968).
7 Id.
8Id.
9 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965).
10 Medical v. Legal Definitions of Death, 204 J.A.M.A. 424 (1968).
1970]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
problems in light of modern medical advances. Historically, the
definition of death has been left to the medical profession rather
than to legislatures or the courts, as medical science is constantly
changing." In agreement with the rest of the world medical com-
munity, United States surgeons assert 2 that since the organ to be
transplanted must be viable at the time of transplantation, the or-
gan must be removed from the donor as close to the time of death
as possible.'" Of course, if it is alleged that the tissues were excised
too soon and the donor was legally alive, the transplanting surgeon
could become involved in civil litigation for negligence" and/or a
criminal action for homicide. 15 In addition, alleged removal of
tissues before actual death could even result in claims of eutha-
nasia against the surgeon. 6
Under the older definitions of death, the patient could be as-
sumed legally dead only if there was no evidence of cardiac function
for ten minutes.'7 Adherence to the classic definitions of death has
led to the following rationale:
Death is the final and irreversible cessation of perceptible heart
beats and respiration. Conversely, as long as any heart beats or
respiration can be perceived, whether with or without mechanical
11 Jinks, California's Response to the Problems of Procuring Human Remains for
Transplantation, 57 CALIF. L REV. 671, 688, (1969).
12 Id.
1a Sommer, Additional Thoughts on the Legal Problems of Heart Transplants, 41
N.Y. ST. B.J. 196 (1969).
14 The widow of the donor in Chicago's first successful heart transplant filed a
million dollar damage suit against Cook County Hospital, charging that her donor-
husband died because of careless and negligent acts by the hospital personnel. N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1969, at 16, col. 2 (city ed.).
15 A heart transplant was performed in Israel, in which the surgeons who performed
the operation were accused of murdering the donor-patient, because of the transplanta-
tion procedures followed. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1969, at 8, col. 6. It has been argued
that, technically, murder may be committed in the transplanting of organs from one
human to another. A murder charge against a physician could result if the doctor took
a vital organ from a donor who had not died from a combination of failure of circulation,
respiration, and brain activity. This is based on the rationale that it is illegal to shorten
life intentionally, no matter how proper the motive or how inevitable the donor's death.
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1968, at 23, col. 1 (city ed.).
16 Ethics in Medical Progress: Whose Responsibility?, 1968 HosP. PRAC. 16.
Euthanasia is the creation of a quiet painless death by an intentional putting to death by
artificial means of persons with incurable or painful illnesses. STEDMAN'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICrIONARY, Williams and Wilkins Co., Baltimore, 21st ed., (1966). Thus,
a patient suffering severe pain from a hopeless case of metastatic carcinoma would be a
foreseeable candidate for euthanasia. All the physician need do is triple the usual dose
of the steroids usually administered to the patient. The patient's reaction would be a
quiet, fairly-rapid expiration. As of March 1970, this procedure is not legal in the
United States.
IT Transplants: Hopes and Anxieties, THE LONDON TIMES, June, 1968.
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or electrical aid, and regardless of how the heart beat and respira-
tion were maintained, death has not occurred. 18
Advances in modern medicine, however, have led to a more
comprehensive understanding of death, which theorizes that man
and his biological system die by degrees rather than suddenly.19 In
other words, death is said to occur at several levels: cellular, bio-
logical, and clinical.'o Under this theory, clinical death occurs when
spontaneous heart beat and breathing cease,21 whereas biological
death is that state of damage and disorganization which even resus-
citation devices cannot reverse.22 Cellular death is an irreversible
degeneration or disorganization of cells which can occur long after
the death of other physiological systems.2"
The older definitions of death are criticized by many surgeons
who argue that the definitions unnecessarily restrict proper use of
transplantable tissue.24  It has been proposed that a more realistic
definition be formulated to preserve tissues for transplantation and
other purposes, 25 and that determination of the moment of death
should be based on uniform and objective medical criteria, rather
than a physician's determination. 20 These would appear to be
strong arguments in cases in which, if the recipient is to benefit,
action must be prompt in excising the organs, since tissues may be
suitable for transplantation only if removed before the failure of
cellular metabolism. Today, many surgeons favor a redefinition of
death based on neurological tests, 28 and the electroencephalogram
(EEG) is considered to be a useful device in confirming the mo-
ment of death.2"
1 8 M. Houts, COURTROOM MEDICINE 17 (1967).
19 Robertson & Stanley, The Significance and Future of Organ Banking, 74 CASE
AND COMMENT 19 (1969).
20 Gorney, The Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 311 (1968).
21 Id.
22 Id; but see Leatherberry, Heart Transplants: Legal Problems and the Need for
New Legislation, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1080 (1968).
23 Supra note 20.
2 4 Supra note 11.
25 Id.
26 Halley & Harvey, On an Interdisciplinary Solution to the Legal-Medical Defini-
tional Dilemma in Death, 2 INDIANA L.F. 217,221 (1969).
2 T Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress, 32 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 563,
568 (1967); see also supra note 4.
28 Lousiell, The Legal Problem in the Procurement of Organs for Transplantation in
the United States and the United Kingdom, F. Largiader, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION.
(2d ed. 1969).
29 Beecher, After the Definition of Irreversible Coma, 271 J.A.M.A. 1070-1071i
(1969).
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Electrical recordings from the surface of the brain or from the
outer surface of the head demonstrate continuous electrical activity
in the brain. Both the intensity and patterns of this electrical ac-
tivity are determined to a great extent by the overall excitation of
the brain resulting from functions in the reticular activating system.
The undulations in the recorded electrical potentials ...are called
brain waves, and the entire record is called an electroencephalo-
gram (EEG).3 o
A further reason some surgeons favor a redefinition of death is
that the ability to maintain circulatory and respiratory functions
should not be the basic determination, because such vital functions
could foreseeably be maintained artificially by resuscitation.3 1
Thus, irreversible loss of cerebral function would appear to be the
major part of any modern definition.3
Current definitions thus favor a declaration of death at the time
of irreversible coma and when irreparable cellular brain damage
has occurred, but before other organs begin to decompose." The
key factor to consider is that if extensive and irreversible brain
damage has occurred, the patient will never again function as a vi-
able individual.3 4
Several attempts at a redefinition of death have been made in
the United States, especially with respect to patients who still
have respiration and circulation although only "vegetating ' 85 in an
unconscious condition and unlikely to ever regain consciousness.3 6
In the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to revise the definition of death, 7 four indications were of-
30 Supra note 4 at 842.
31 Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation and the Law: The Need for Organized Sensi-
tivity, 57 GEo. L.J. 27 (1968); see generally; Biorck, Thoughts on Life and Death,
1968 PERSPEcTIvE BIOL. MED. 527; Resuscitation is the use of a resuscitator apparatus
which forces oxygen into the lungs, thereby allowing for oxygen to get into the circula-
tory system. If the heart has stopped, it must be re-started by cardiac shock, massage or
injection of epinephrine. Unless the heart is beating, resuscitation will prove useless,
for after approximately four minutes anoxia of the brain will cause irreversible damage.
Supra note 4.
32 Supra note 6; see also; Silverman, Saunders, Schwab and Masland, Cerebral Death
and the EEG, 209 J.A.M.A. 1505 (1969); Peters, Law and Human Organ Transplanta-
tion, 18 MEDicO-LEGAL BULL. 2 (1969).
33 Use of Cadavers in Transplants Urged, 1969 AMA NEWS 1.
34 Burgh, Is Medical Treatment Being Overlooked Because of the Vogue for Trans-
plants?, 1968 MED. WORLD NEWS 67; see also, Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30
OHIO ST. U.J. 32 (1969).
35 Ayd, What is Death?, 1969 THE NEW PHYsIcIAN 286.
36 Castel, Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation, 77 AM. HEART J. 131
(1969).
37 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337
(1968).
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fered to determine the moment of death in an individual suffering
from irreversible coma as a result of permanent brain damage: (1)
unreceptivity and unresponsitivity to externally-applied stimuli,
(2) no movements or breathing for about an hour, (3) no reflexes,
showing an abolition of central nervous system activitiy, and (4) a
flat EEG."' The validity of data from the above indicators, 9 how-
ever, depends on the absence of either hypothermia4" or central
nervous system depresants.4'
Another definition of death proposed by Dr. Paul S. Rhoads
stresses more certainty in the cases where resuscitation has been
used. He suggests criteria of: (1) fixed, dilated pupils, (2) the
complete absence of reflexes to painful stimuli, (3) total absence of
respiration and circulation for five minutes after respiration has
stopped, and (4) a flat EEG.42
Dr. James Z. Appel has compiled a more detailed list of the indi-
cators of death, putting special emphasis upon optic and cardiac
functions. His list includes (1) the complete bilateral dilation of
pupils with no reaction to local constricting stimuli, (2) the absence
of all reflexes, (3) the total cessation of respiration five minutes
after cessation of mechanical respiration, (4) a falling blood pres-
sure, and (5) a flat EEG.43
It is worthwhile to note, however, that some authorities believe
reliance on nearly flat or temporarily flat brain waves is not an ade-
quate criterion for determining death, especially since severe barbit-
uate poisoning can produce a nearly flat EEG.4 Furthermore an
air embolism45 developed during surgery can also lead to a tempor-
arily flat EEG.48 With such possibilities, it has been argued that
38 Id. at 337-339.
89 Id.
4OHypothermia is a condition where the body temperature is below 90 degrees
Fahrenheit or 32.2 degrees centigrade.
41 Central Nervous System Depressants are therapeutics such as barbiturates or tran-
quilizers; also, ethyl alcohol.
42 Rhoads, Medical Ethics and Morals in a New Age, 205 J.A.M.A. 117 (1968).
48 Appel, Ethical and Legal Questions Posed by Recent Advances in Medicine, 205
J.A.M.A. 513 (1968).
44 Beecher, Ethical Problems Created by the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient, 278
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1425 (1968).
45 An air embolism is a quanity of air bubbles which enter the body through an
opening such as a wound or surgical incision where major arteries or veins are incised.
This mass can enter the exposed pulmonary arteries, in a heart transplant, or other major
vessels in other types of transplants. If the air bubbles reach the heart's chambers, a
fatal response could result; see ROBBINS, PATHOLOGY 159 (3rd ed. 1967).
4 S Beecher, supra note 44.
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the physician should observe cessation of electrical activity in the
brain over an extensive period, combined with the failure to respond
to any intense stimmulation.47
With such a variety of proposed criteria and the multitude of
complications which are always possible, physicians are very con-
cerned about the possibility of litigation being brought against them,
such as for excising an organ from a donor who is dead for all
practical purposes, but whose respiration is being maintained by a
resuscitator.48 With the numerous possibilities of litigation sur-
rounding transplantation procedures, it has been maintained that a
uniform statute is needed to set guidelines for human organ trans-
plantation procedures throughout the United States.49
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,5" as of February, 1970, has
been adopted by 41 states." The Act creates a right in any person
of sound mind and 18 years of age to donate his body and pre-
cludes revocation of the donation by relatives.52 The Act also al-
lows donation by means of a written instrument, thus avoiding pro-
bate complications, and permits survivors to donate another's organs
where the deceased failed to indicate his intentions.53  While this
uniform legislation attempts to facilitate donation for public bene-
fit, it prohibits removal of organs or tissues unless proper consent
is given. In addition, the Act allows the donor to revoke his gift
anytime before his death, names individuals and institutions who
may be donees, lists the purposes for which a donation may be used,
and eliminates complications of civil liability or criminal prosecution
for anyone acting in good faith under the guidelines of the provi-
sions.5 It is important to note, however, that the Act is limited to
ante-mortem donations and does not help solve the current problem
47Id.
48 Ethics in Medical Progress: Whose Responsibility?, 1968 Hosp. PRAC. 16.
49 Stewart, Human Organ Transplantation - The Medical Miracle and the Legal
Maze, 20 S. CAROLINA L. REv. 521 (1968).
5o Porzio, THE TRANSPLANT AGE 111 (1969); Stason, The Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAw 919, 927-929, (1969).
51 Sadler, Sadler and Stason, Transplantation and the Law: Progress Toward Uni-
formity, 282 NEW ENG. J. MED. 717 (1970); see generally; Richards, Medical-Legal
Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 108 (1969) - a survey of all
existing state statutes on transplantation, in the United States, as of November, 1969;
Cardiac and Other Organ Transplantation, 206 J.A.M.A. 2496 (1968).
52 Supra note 50 at 919.
53 TIME, April 26, 1969, vol. 93, at 61.
54 Fisher, Let the Dead Help the Living, 47 TODAY'S HEALTH 88 (1969).
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of inter-vivos gifts, such ,as kidney donations from the living donor."
While this Act does not resolve the problem of determination of
death, it does require in section 7 (b) that:
The time of death shall be determined by a physician who tends
the donor at his death, or if none, the physician who certifies the
death. The physician shall not participate in the procedures for
removing or transplanting a part.56
The problem of defining the moment of death has also been a
controversial subject in other countries. 7
In Canada, while there is law pertaining to various aspects of
post-mortem examinations and disposal of cadavers,58 along with
the Model Act,59 which deals with various aspects of human organ
transplantation and donation, there is no set legal definition of
death.6 One analyst of Canadian law"' believes the trend is to
require that proof of death be based on fatal injuries or conditions,
especially when the central nervous system is effected.62
The Soviet Union has not yet formulated a modern definition
of death, since Soviet physicians have been hesitant to accept a def-
inition of death based on absence of brain waves." However, it
has been stated that Russian scientists are interested in medical
progress of this nature and have expanded their own research
projects. 64
In Sweden, the Royal Board of Medicine has not agreed on a
modern definition of death that would even allow for kidney trans-
plants. A Swedish donor is not declared dead until 36 hours after
heart activity has completely ceased."5
In Israel, there is a trend away from the older definition of
death, 6 based on cessation of breathing and heart beat, to the re-
55 Woodside, Organ 'Transplantation: The Doctor's Dilemma and the Lawyer's Re-
sponsibility, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 66, 89 (1970).
56 Porzio, supra note 50.
5r See generally; Castel, Some Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation in Canada,
48 CAN. B. REV. 345 (1968); Symposium, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 345 (1969).
58 Ontario: R.S.O., 1960, c. 14, s. 14, as amended by 1964, c.2.
5 9 Ontario Act, S.O., 1962-1963, c.59, as amended by S.O. 1967, c. 38, s.2(2).
0 Id.
61 Castel, supra note 57, at 351-352.
62 Id.
63 NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1968, vol. 72, at 84.
64 Id.
65 Biorck, On the Definitions of Death, 1967 WORLD MED. J. 137-138.
66 SHUL. AR. ORAH HAIM cccxxix, 4; cf. RESP. HATAM SAFER, YOREH DEAH
cccxxxviii.
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quirement of additional technical criteria consistent with advances
in modern medicine.07 Present Israeli law provides standards for
scientific research with cadavers, allows post-mortem examinations,
and permits organs to be donated for transplantation. "
There also appears to be movement toward dealing with certain
problems in transplantation procedures in Great Britain. 6  The Sec-
retary of State's Conference on Organ Transplantation declared that
two independent doctors not involved with a transplant team should
certify the death of the donor.70
In South Africa much work has been done toward developing
a definition of death considering the interrelated functions of the
heart, lungs and brain.7 In January, 1970, a bill was presented to
the South African Parliament" re-defining the moment of death
as that moment when the brain ceases to function. Since cardiac
failure is not involved in this new determination transplant surgeons
can excise a beating heart from a body in which the brain has a
flat EEG.
The Ministry of Health in Czechoslovakia has resolved the def-
inition of death problem in the same fashion as UniformAnatomi-
cal Gift Act by declaring that the attending physician will have dis-
cretion to terminate support for patients with irreversable brain dam-
age.73
The government of France has been involved in several attempts
to help effect criteria for human organ transplantation.74 In 1966,
the French National Academy of Medicine, in a very controversial
declaration, stated that a patient may be adjudged dead if his EEG
has shown an absence of brain activity for 48 hours, and surgeons
should then be allowed to remove his organs for transplantation.75
In April of 1968, the French government removed legal obstacles to
transplantation procedures by defining death as the cessation of
brain activity rather than respiration: 76
6 7 Elon, Jewish Law and Modern Medicine, 4 ISRAEL L. REv. 475, (1969).
68 Baker, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL, Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, Israel,
1968, at 222.
6 9 N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1969, at 32, col. 1 (city ed.).
70 Id.
71 Hunt, Defining Death, 85 S. AFR. L.J. 201 (1968).
72 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1970, at 7, col. 1 (city ed.).
73 Official Directive of the Ministry of Health of Czechoslovakia, as supplementing
the Health Code of 1966; see also Porzio, supra note 50, at 102.
74 Porzio, supra note 51, at 102.
75 TIME, May 27, 1966, at 78.
76 "Official Definitional Adoption," Council of Ministers of France, April 27, 1968.
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The absence of heartbeat, blood circulation and respiration are no
longer to be considered as signs of death; the clinical signs of death
are now the total absence of cerebral activity evidenced by several
flat encephalograms as well as complete lack of reflexes for a suf-
ficient period of time."7
There have been several attempts at international medical meet-
ings to define the moment of death for heart transplantation pur-
poses.
In 1968, at an international meeting of surgeons experienced in
heart transplantation, held at Cape Town, South Africa, specialists
from Brazil, India, England, Canada, Argentina, South Africa, and
the United States agreed that certain criteria are essential in deter-
mining the moment of death. They agreed that the absence of nat-
ural heartbeat, respiration or reflexes, and a flat EEG showing ab-
sence of brain wave function are necessary."8
In Sydney, Australia, the World Medical Assembly adopted a
code79 which prescribes that at least two physicians must pronounce
the donor dead before transplantation surgery can take place. The
code suggests the physicians with the responsibility for determining
the moment of death should base their decision on clinical judg-
ment and diagnostic aids, such as the EEG."0
In 1969 at an international symposium of medical specialists and
theologians in Spain, it was argued that the determination of death
should be based upon "bio-electrical silence of the brain" for 24
hours. In addition, tests must be run at 30 minute intervals to de-
termine whether the patient exhibits the clinical symptoms of in-
ability to breathe unaided, lack of reflexes, and alterations of the
pupils and blood circulation.81
CONCLUSION
While the foregoing international medical meetings have been
informative, there is a definite need for adoption of uniform laws
on all aspects of human organ transplantation on an international
scale. While science has made remarkable advances in transplanta-
tion, the law has lagged behind in failing to create uniform guide-
See generally Hess, Heart Transplanted in France; Operation First Done in Europe,
N.Y. Times, April 30, 1968, at 51, col. 5 (city ed.).
77Id.
78 TIME, July 26 1968, vol. 92, at 49.
79 Durdin, Physicians Adopt a Code on Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1968, at 25,
col. 1 (city ed.).
80 Id.
81 N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1969, at 58, col. 7 (city ed.).
1970]
CASE W. RES. 1. INT'L L.
lines for the surgeons and other medical personnel involved. De-
termination of the precise moment of death is a major concern of
all surgeons who require viable tissues for transplantation. Under
the older, classic definition of death, the tissues received were often
already decomposing. Thus, there should be effected an interna-
tional agreement on the criteria for the moment of death, so that
final determination can be made legally clear to the physician, either
while attending the patient or during operation of a resuscitator.
An international agreement to resolve the issues of transplanta-
tion should be modeled along the lines of the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, but should also include a more precise definition of death
based on the latest international scientific findings. Such an agree-
ment should also provide for the establishment of an international
donor bank, where a computer could be used to store lists of volun-
tary donors of different countries, according to tissues to be donated,
antigen matching, and other necessary data which would facilitate
international organ transplantation procedures. To avoid techni-
cal complications, at a time when speed is of the essence, the inter-
national agreement should also allow for rapid procedures in trans-
porting tissues across national borders, from a donor in one nation
to a recipient in another.
Just as the legal profession must modify the law to keep pace
with the progress of the medical profession, individuals from all
nations who desire progress in international transplantation pro-
cedures should join together to effect a uniform international agree-
ment. Only with inter-professional understanding between attor-
neys and physicians and an international agreement and effort
between people of all nations will human organ transplantation
truly benefit all mankind.
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